The Syrian state began reasserting its control over pro-regime militias, including the Shia militias close to Hezbollah and Iran. Looking ahead, it seems unlikely that Assad will be forced to choose between Iran and Russia. All three actors are united by flexible politics and common rivals, which gives each side room to make decisions in line with their own interests. And Syria, Russia, and Iran all understand that a weakened partner could ultimately lead to their own loss of power.
Taurus, , 87— Tauris, , See Husayn Agha and Ahmad S. New York: Oxford University Press, , See Goodarzi, Syria and Iran , Cordesman with George Sullivan and William D. Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author s and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Downtown Beirut, P. Box Riad El Solh, Lebanon. In an increasingly crowded, chaotic, and contested world and marketplace of ideas, the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center offers decisionmakers global, independent, and strategic insight and innovative ideas that advance international peace. By using this website, you agree to our cookie policy.
Carnegie Middle East Center. Issues Projects Regions Blogs. Print Page. Key Periods in the Syria-Hezbollah Relationship In the s, Syria-Hezbollah relations were characterized by both cooperation and tension. After the Lebanese civil war ended in , Hezbollah acquiesced to Syrian control. Yet Syria also used Hezbollah as leverage in those talks. Both sides understand that a weakened partner could lead to their own loss of power, which has consistently justified intervention to support the other.
The Syrian government enjoys the regional influence afforded by its close relationship with Hezbollah. In the aftermath of the Syrian war, the Assad regime will seek to rebalance relations with Hezbollah and regain its previous advantage. Introduction Political Islam.
Mohanad Hage Ali is the director of communications and a fellow at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center. Related analysis from Carnegie Keeping an Eye on Baghdad. The Politics of Perdition. Popular Articles. Malcolm H. Follow Us. The Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah trilateral partnership has been decades in the making.
It pre-dates the Syrian civil war, has strengthened as a result of the war and will likely endure in the post-war years. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in , Tehran and Damascus joined forces to found Hezbollah, mainly to enhance their respective deterrence capabilities against Israel and the United States.
Tehran has played a careful long game in the Syrian civil war. One component of this game is to outsource most of the fighting to thousands of loyal Syrian militias, Hezbollah and Shia fighters from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In plain terms, this is the space located between the coast and the Qusayr-Homs-Aleppo axis. In this view, the changing balance of power between the Syrian regime in Damascus and its opposition would logically and necessarily replicate itself in Lebanon between the two coalitions.
But, the potential ramifications in Lebanon of what happens in Syria demonstrate that,contrary to the popular adage, the enemy of my enemy is not necessarily my friend.
To start with, Lebanese Christians of all political stripes are not happy with the major role played by the Sunni jihadists at the heart of the anti-Assad networks. Shocked by what their Iraqi co-religionists have suffered in recent years and what has already happened to their counterparts in Syria, Lebanese Christians see their worst nightmare in the arrival in Lebanon of a similar regime of repression, abuse, and ultimately forced exile.
The massive coordinated attack by Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS in the summer of on the area around Arsal in the Bekaa overwhelmingly confirmed in the eyes of many Lebanese that the jihadist menace for their small country of 18 official denominations is in fact no illusion. Thus, the Christians already favorably disposed toward Hezbollah have no reason to change their position—all the more so in light of the embarrassing position in which their March 14 co-religionists find themselves, given the strength of jihadist groups in the Syrian opposition.
Indeed, Geagea, who had argued for months after the outbreak of the insurrection in Syria that an Islamist regime there would not prove harmful to Christians, abruptly abandoned that claim before ended. The Maronite patriarch himself, Msgr. The two camps and their followers hold highly defined views regarding their political, factional, regional, and international allegiances.
On the one hand, March 8 is allied to Syria and Iran and looks positively on Russia. Middle East In Focus is a synopsis of commentary and news from Middle Eastern and other international media.
Its purpose is to provide a succinct and balanced summary of the main developments and views that are often overlooked or not properly reflected in the U. Comments and feedback are welcome at info mepc. Hezbollah's "Foreign Intervention" in Syria.
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